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C E D U R E

What Constitutes Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
at Sentencing?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 141-144. © 2000 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisc.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377. Prof. Grenig is
a co-author of West's FederalJury
Practiceand Instructions
(5th ed.).

ISSUE
Was Paul Glover denied effective
assistance of counsel when his
lawyers failed to argue that Glover's
money-laundering offenses should
be grouped with his labor racketeering offenses in calculating his sentence under the federal sentencing
guidelines?
FACTS
In June 1995, Paul Glover, the vicepresident and general counsel of the
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and
Warehouse Workers Union, was convicted in federal court of conspiracy,
soliciting and receiving kickbacks,
money laundering, and tax evasion.
His conviction arose out of his conduct in connection with a series of
investments made with money
belonging to the pension and health
and welfare funds of a Chicago
union.
In the Preliminary Presentence
Investigation Report ("PPSI"), the
United States Probation Office recommended grouping the moneylaundering and kickback counts
pursuant to the Federal Uniform

Sentencing Guidelines. The United
States objected to the PPSI, arguing
that the money-laundering and
kickback offenses should not be
grouped together and that Glover
should receive a two-level multiple
count adjustment under the guidelines. Glover's counsel did not file a
written response. At the sentencing
hearing, the court asked Glover's
counsel to address the government's
objections to the grouping of offenses. He responded that he thought
grouping was "appropriate" but did
not cite any authority.
The district court ruled for the government and ordered that the
money-laundering and kickback
offenses be treated separately. The
district court determined that
Glover's adjusted offense level under
the sentencing guidelines was 28
and that his criminal history category was I, resulting in a sentencing
range of 78 to 97 months in prison.
The court selected a midpoint in the
(Continued on Page 142)
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range, sentencing Glover to 84
months in prison.
Glover then appealed his conviction. Counsel again did not challenge the district court's refusal to
group together the money-laundering and kickback offenses. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence in December
1996.
In November 1997, Glover filed a
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the ground that
his lawyer was ineffective in failing
to argue that the sentencing court
should have grouped his moneylaundering offenses with his conspiracy and kickback offenses under
the Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines. Glover argued that, but
for the errors of his counsel, his
adjusted offense level would have
been 26, resulting in a range of
63-78 months' imprisonment. The
district court denied the motion,
and Glover appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
Glover claimed that his attorney's
failure to argue the correct interpretation of the sentencing guidelines
led to an adjusted offense level two
levels higher than it should have
been. He argued that the Seventh
Circuit's decision in United States v.
Wilson, 98 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1996),
had held that money-laundering
offenses and mail-fraud offenses
should be grouped together under
the Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court in an unpublished opinion. It explained that in order to
successfully claim ineffective assistance, Glover would need to show
both that his counsel performed
below a constitutional threshold and
that the deficient performance prejudiced him. The Seventh Circuit

noted that if Glover was correct
about the errors of his counsel, his
sentence should have been six to 21
months lower than the 84-month
sentence he received. The court
concluded, however, that this potential decrease is not sufficiently significant to be cognizable on collateral attack.

"counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment; and (2)
the defendant must show that the
deficient performance "prejudiced"
his defense by showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive him of a fair trial-a trial
whose result is reliable. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The Supreme Court granted
Glover's petition for a writ of certiorari and is now reviewing the
Seventh Circuit's decision. 120 S.Ct.
2716 (1999).

The Seventh Circuit has taken the
position that only a significant
increase in the sentence rises to the
level of the type of prejudice that
will support an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on collateral
attack. See Martin v. United States,
109 F.3d 1177 (7th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997);
Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548
(7th Cir. 1993).

CASE ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel accords a
criminal defendant the right "to
have the assistance of counsel for
his defense." The Supreme Court
has recognized that the right to
counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel. McMann v.
Richardson,397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Counsel can deprive a defendant of
the right to effective assistance
merely by failing to render "adequate legal assistance." Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 427 U.S. 97, 344 (1976).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court
ruled that the proper standard for
attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. It stated that the benchmark for judging a
claim of ineffectiveness is whether
the counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
According to the Supreme Court,
there are two components in determining whether counsel's assistance
was so defective as to require reversal of conviction: (1) the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient, in that the
attorney made errors so serious that
he or she was not functioning as the

Durrive involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to
the federal sentencing guidelines.
Interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Seventh
Circuit ruled that in the absence of
"[g]rave errors by judge and counsel," misapplication of the federal
sentencing guidelines does not make
the sentence "unreliable or ... fundamentally unfair."
Glover argues that Strickland does
not provide any support for the
Seventh Circuit's requirement of
"significant" prejudice. He argues
that Strickland established the
clear rule that the prejudice prong
is satisfied where there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have
been different."
According to Glover, in adopting its
"significant prejudice" requirement,
the Seventh Circuit was plainly
motivated in part by concerns about
the burden that habeas corpus challenges place on the federal judiciary.
However, he argues that vindication
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of basic constitutional rights should
not be denied on the basis that the
judicial procedures to enforce them
are time-consuming or expensive.
Glover suggests that the Seventh
Circuit's fears are overblown and
that only a limited number of petitioners will be able to identify with
specificity a particular sentencing
guideline provision that was incorrectly calculated and then make the
required showing of a different outcome by a "reasonable probability."
It is Glover's position that the
Seventh Circuit's refusal to correct
erroneous sentences unless the period of undeserved imprisonment is
"sufficiently significant" is bad policy and an anathema to the law. He
says that upholding incorrect sentences thwarts the purposes of
Congress in enacting the sentencing
guidelines by allowing disparities in
sentences to flourish and calls into
question the judiciary's commitment to fairness.
Glover claims that the six to 21
additional months of imprisonment
caused by his counsel's ineffective
assistance plainly constitutes the
"difference in outcome" required to
satisfy the Strickland prejudice test.
He also argues that the Seventh
Circuit's requirement for "significant prejudice" is incompatible with
the Supreme Court's most fundamental teachings regarding the protections of the Sixth Amendment.
Glover notes that the constitutional
right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is implicated by any
term of imprisonment, no matter
how short. See Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979); Argersingerv.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
The government responds that the
failure of Glover's counsel to argue
that his money-laundering and racketeering offenses should be grouped
under the sentencing guidelines did
not constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. The government agrees
that Strickland should apply to
issues concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in sentencing
proceedings that involve the guidelines. Nonetheless, the government
contends that the application of the
Strickland test to sentencing proceedings under the guidelines
should take into account the
particular characteristics of those
proceedings.

held that, barring extraordinary circumstances, an error in the application of the sentencing guidelines
cannot be raised in a collateral proceeding. See, e.g., United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.
1999); Jones v. United States, 178
F.3d 790 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
120 S.Ct. 335 (1999); United States
v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1164
(1999).

The government notes that the
judge retains significant discretion
in applying the guidelines to the
particular facts before him. The
judge must select a sentence from
within the applicable guidelines
range and must decide whether to
depart from the guidelines.
Additionally, not every claim relevant to the guidelines criteria will
change the applicable guidelines
range, and because there is substantial overlap among guidelines
ranges, not every change in the
guidelines range will have an impact
on the defendant's sentence.

According to the government, the
Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the need to customize the
Strickland analysis to the nature of
noncapital sentencing proceedings.
However, the government asserts
that, in its effort to tailor the analysis to that context, the Seventh
Circuit modified the prejudice
inquiry in a manner that is both
inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's cases and unworkable.

Therefore, the government argues, it
will usually be difficult, if not impossible, for a reviewing court to assess
the reasonableness of counsel's decision to focus on one claim rather
than another. Moreover, the government says that it will frequently be
difficult or impossible for the
reviewing court to determine
whether the failure to raise a particular claim resulted in a reasonable
probability of a different sentencing
outcome.
The government also asserts that
collateral relief is rarely available for
claims that do not assert constitutional or jurisdictional errors. It
stresses that errors in the application of the guidelines do not implicate the determination of guilt or
innocence. The government
observes that the vast majority of
the federal courts of appeals have

Although it agrees with Glover that
the Seventh Circuit did not apply
the correct prejudice inquiry, the
government contends that the failure of Glover's counsel to argue that
his client's money-laundering and
racketeering offenses should be
grouped did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Contending that the grouping argument lacks merit, the government
says that Glover's counsel did not
act unreasonably in failing to present a meritless claim. The government also contends that, on appeal,
Glover's counsel merely decided to
bypass the grouping issue in order
to focus on other claims and maximize the likelihood of success.
The government then argues that,
in any event, Glover was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to
raise the grouping claim. Because of
the nature of the sentencing guidelines system, the government
asserts that it will often be difficult
(Continued on Page 144)
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for a defendant to establish the necessary degree of probability that an
omitted legal claim (even if meritorious) would have affected the outcome of a sentencing proceeding.
The government observes that when
a legal claim that counsel failed to
present adequately would not have
resulted in a guidelines range below
the defendant's sentence, the defendant will be unable to establish a
reasonable probability that a more
effective attorney would have
helped produce a different result.
Even if Glover were correct that his
money-laundering and labor racketeering offenses should have been
grouped, the government says, that
grouping would have increased,
rather than decreased, the applicable guidelines range.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines operate by listing a number of offense and offender characteristics and then calculating a
defendant's sentence on the basis of
these characteristics. As a result,
sentencing under the guidelines in
federal court is a highly structured,
formulaic process. The guidelines
are intended to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
Since Strickland, the Supreme
Court has evaluated a number of
claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel by criminal defendants. See
Roe v. Flores-Ortega,120 S.Ct.
1029 (2000) (applying Strickland to
a claim of ineffectiveness based on
counsel's failure to file a notice of
appeal); Williams v. Taylor, 120
S.Ct. 1495 (2000) (applying
Strickland to a claim of ineffectiveness based on counsel's failure to
investigate and present substantial
mitigating evidence during capital
sentence proceeding); Smith v.
Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000)

(applying Strickland to counsel's
decision not to file a full merits brief
on appeal); Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527 (1986) (applying
Strickland to evaluate counsel's failure to raise a capital sentencing
claim on appeal); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)
(applying Strickland to counsel's
failure to file a suppression motion);
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168 (1986) (applying Strickland to
a claim that trial counsel failed to
adequately present mitigating evidence); Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52
(1985) (applying Strickland to a
claim of ineffective assistance in a
noncapital plea context).

have been different." 120 S.Ct. at
1502. The Court explained that
Lockhart provided a narrow exception to the ordinary prejudice rule.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Paul L. Glover (Michael L.
Waldman (202) 639-7000)
For the United States (Seth P.
Waxman, Solicitor General,
U.S. Department of Justice
(202) 514-2217)

The Seventh Circuit's "significant
prejudice" requirement is derived
from its interpretation of Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
The Seventh Circuit understands
Lockhart as adding to the prejudice
prong of Strickland a requirement
that the result be "fundamentally
unfair or unreliable." The Fifth
Circuit also applies a "significant
prejudice" test. See Spriggs v.
Collins, 993 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.
1495 (2000), the Supreme Court
reviewed a decision by the Fourth
Circuit that had denied a defendant's habeas petition despite
acknowledging a reasonable probability that counsel's incompetence
at the sentencing hearing had
resulted in an increased sentence.
The Fourth Circuit had interpreted
Lockhart as requiring that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel show that the result
was "fundamentally unfair or
unreliable."
The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit, holding that the correct standard is the Strickland
requirement that the defendant
show that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ...
would
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